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Gruver: Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law - Applying the Fruit of th
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Applying the "Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" Doctrine to Evidence Obtained through Statements
Made Without Proper Miranda Warnings. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82

(Wyo. 1983).
In July 1981, Pete Stamper was arrested on a charge of second degree
murder in connection with the death of John Smith. Smith died following a
fight with Stamper outside of a Wyoming saloon.1
Stamper was arrested by members of the Fremont County Sheriff's office at his residence. Without advising Stamper of his Mirandarights, but
after placing him under arrest, an officer asked Stamper for the boots
Stamper had worn on the night of the fight. In response, 2Stamper went into his house, got his boots and gave them to the officer.
At Stamper's trial the judge ruled that the boots were admissible. Any
statement elicited from Stamper concerning the boots, however, was not
admissible because of the failure to provide Mirandawarnings. 8 Although
no statements about Stamper's ownership of the boots were allowed, the
boots were admitted in evidence, over objection, simply by the prosecution
stating that it would like to admit this pair of boots in evidence. No
testimony concerning the ownership of the boots was given.4 Stamper was
convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under section
6-4-506(b) of the Wyoming Statutes. 5
Stamper appealed, arguing that the evidence (boots) was obtained in
violation of his rights under the fourth 6 and fifth' amendments to the
1. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo. 1983).

2. Id. at 85.
3. Id.

4. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1983). Stamper's
counsel objected to admitting the boots due to the lack of sufficient foundation in light of
the trial judge's previous ruling excluding testimony about their acquisition. The trial
judge overruled the objection stating that the jury knew that Stamper probably was not
barefoot on the night of the fight and that everyone could assume that the jury would
assume these were the boots Stamper had worn. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the boots were improperly admitted because sufficient foundation had not been laid for
their admission. This error was prejudicial and required reversal of Stamper's conviction.
662 P.2d at 85.
5. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-506(b) (1977) provides:
With a dangerous weapon. Whoever, while armed with a dangerous or
deadly weapon, including an unloaded firearm, maliciously perpetrates an
assault or an assault and battery upon any human being, shall be fined not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in the penitentiary not
more than fourteen (14) years, or both.
(Current version at Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-502 (1977)).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides:
No person shall be... subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
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United States Constitution, and article I section 48 and article I section 119
of the Wyoming Constitution. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and remanded the case. 10 The court held that the state failed to
establish that the evidence warranted giving the lesser-included-offense instruction upon which Stamper was convicted."
This Note will deal with the question raised by Justice Rose in a footnote to his majority opinion. 12 The question raised was whether the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wang Sun v. United States's applies
when the police recover physical evidence as a result of a statement obtained without giving proper Miranda warnings. Justice Rose conceded that
the question was a difficult one, but felt that Miranda" only applies in the
context of testimony or communication requiring the accused to incriminate himself.' 5 Justice Rose thus expressed doubt that the doctrine is
applicable to Miranda violations which produce physical evidence. 16
This Note will consider whether the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine should apply to evidence obtained by the police as a result of
statements made without the benefit of proper Miranda warnings. This
Note will first view the Supreme Court decision in Wang Sun and the exclusionary rule in general. 17 Then Mirandav. ArizonaI8 and related Supreme
Court cases will be discussed, with concentration centered on the Supreme
Court's view of what Miranda'sfunction should be. Because the Supreme
Court has not directly answered Justice Rose's question, 19 a few lower
court decisions answering it will be examined. Finally, after considering
the reasons given by the Supreme Court for the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine and for Miranda,a conclusion will be reached as to whether
it is logical to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to Miranda
violations.
8. Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 4 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.
9. Wyo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11 provides:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury
disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be
reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in
jeopardy.
10. 662 P.2d at 93.
11. Id. The lesser included offense instruction was not warranted because the only evidence
with respect to a deadly weapon was the boots and the boots were never properly connected with the defendant. This meant that the prosecution never produced a deadly
weapon and so there was no proper way to convict Stamper of a crime which necessitated
a deadly weapon. See supra note 5.
12. 662 P.2d at 91 n.8.
13. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. 662 P.2d at 91 n.8.
16. Id.
17. Although a brief history of the exclusionary rule is presented it is at most a cursory view.
For a thorough accounting see 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. See suprm text accompanying notes 12-16.
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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Generally, the exclusionary rule commands that evidence obtained in
violation of the privileges guaranteed by the Constitution must be excluded
at trial. 20 The rule is intended to serve the following purposes: (1) to prevent courts from becoming accomplices in disobedience of the
Constitution;2 1 (2) to assure people that the government will not profit from
its unlawful behavior; 22 and (3) to deter future illegal conduct by the
police. 23 This final purpose, deterrence, has become the major purpose for
the rule.2 4 It is important to keep these purposes in mind because the
Court's view
of the purposes for the rule will determine the scope and fate
25

of the rule.

The branch of the exclusionary rule this note is primarily concerned
with is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United
States.2 6 In Wong Sun, federal agents arrested one Horn Way for possession of heroin.27 Horn Way, who had not before been an informant, told the
officers that he had purchased the heroin from a person known to him only
as "Blackie Toy," who operated a laundry on Leavenworth Street. 28 The
agents, with this information only, went to "Oye's Laundry" on Leavenworth Street. The proprietor (Toy) came to the door and when the agent
identified himself, Toy fled down the hallway. All of the agents broke open
the door, captured Toy and placed him under arrest. 29 In response to the
agents' accusations, Toy stated that he had not been selling narcotics but
he did know someone who had. 0 The agents left and by using Toy's
statements, found one Johnny Yee and several tubes containing heroin in
Yee's bedroom. 3 '

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that there were
no reasonable grounds for Toy's arrest.32 Because this was an illegal arrest, Toy's statements were considered fruits of unlawful action and thus
fell within the protection of the exclusionary rule.33 More importantly, the
Supreme Court also held that the drugs obtained from Yee also fell within4
the exclusionary rule because they were "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Thus in Wong Sun, the Court decided that evidence obtained through
statements made by a defendant, whose fourth amendment rights had been
violated, should not be admissible against the defendant.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979).
21. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1
(1978).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
27. Id. at 473.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 474.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 475.
32. Id. at 479.
33. Id. at 487.
34. Id. at 488.
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The holding in Wong Sun does not mean that all evidence is "fruit of
the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police.3 5 The Court expressly rejected this "but
for" test and stated that the determining question is whether the evidence
was discovered by the exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.36 This is an attempt to mark the point at which the illegal activity of the police is so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer
justifies the cost.37 The cost is depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence 38 thus denying the trier of fact knowledge of this relevant
evidence.
In addition to this attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule, there
are two other major exceptions. One is the independent source test, which
generally means that if not even the "but for" test can be met, then the
evidence is not a fruit of the prior fourth amendment violation. 9 This exception thus allows evidence to be admitted when an independent source
for discovering the evidence exists. 40 Another exception to the exclusionary rule is the "inevitable discovery" rule. This rule has not been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court but it has been used by many
lower courts."1 This exception differs from the independent source rule.
Here the question is not whether the police in fact acquired evidence by
reliance on an untainted source. Instead, evidence falls within the inevitable discovery exception if the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered lawfully. 42 The trial judge must be convinced that without any illegal conduct by the police the evidence would have been discovered. Admitting evidence through the inevitable discovery exception has been attacked as being completely at odds with the purpose for the exclusionary
rule because it allows the police to gain an advantage while standing to lose
only something that they would not have otherwise had. 43 This criticism of
the inevitable discovery exception is well founded. The exclusionary rule
loses much of its deterrent effect when police officers are allowed to take
this "no risk" action. The inevitable discovery exception
has also been at44
tacked because it encourages police short-cutting.
The scope of the exclusionary rule has been narrowed by three major
exceptions. 4 In addition, the exclusionary rule has been limited by the
Supreme Court's perception of what the rule is and what its function should
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
38. Id. at 612.
39. 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURT AMENDMENT § 11.4
(1978).
40. Id. There is a stronger argument for admission of evidence when the independent source
is discovered before the illegal activity than when it is discovered after the illegal activity.

Id.

41. Id. at § 11.4 n.42.
42. Id. at § 11.4.
43. Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea For Relevant Criteria,115 U. PA. L.
REV. 1136, 1143 (1967).
44. Id. Police short-cutting is encouraged by the inevitable discovery exception because the
police can often illegally obtain evidence with less effort and this evidence can be admitted through the exception.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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be. In Illinois v. Gates et. ux., 46 the Supreme Court restated its view that

the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
fourth amendment rights, and is not a personal Constitutional right of the
party aggrieved. 47 The function of the exclusionary rule is to prevent, not
repair, and thus is used to deter future illegal activity by the police by excluding evidence obtained through such activity. 48 Although not every
member of the Court adheres to this view, 49 Gates reflects the current view
of the majority of the Court and this view of the rule leads to further limitations on its application.
One way this view of the exclusionary rule has limited its application
appears in United States v. Ceccolini.50 In Ceccolini, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule should be invoked with greater reluctance
when the illegally obtained evidence is a live witness as opposed to an inanimate object. 51 Although writers have attacked this distinction as one
without a logical basis, 52 it is logical if one considers the Supreme Court's
view of the exclusionary rule.
If the exclusionary rule's function is deterrence, there is less reason to
exclude a willing witness than there is reason to exclude an inanimate object. This is because a willing witness is more likely to be discovered by
legal means and thus there is less incentive to conduct an illegal search.5 3
Since there is less incentive to conduct an illegal search for such a witness,
64
there is less of a deterrent function served by excluding such evidence.
Another reason to distinguish between types of derivative evidence
springs from the concept that a balancing test should be used whenever the
exclusionary rule is used. 55 The three purposes of the exclusionary rule,56
with deterrence weighing most heavily, must be balanced against the cost
of denying to the trier of fact relevant information. The truthseeking function is often impaired to a greater extent when live-witness testimony is excluded than when tangible evidence is excluded.57 Since excluding live
witnesses is often more costly than excluding tangible evidence, courts
should consider what type of evidence they are dealing with when applying
the exclusionary rule.
Finally, the exclusionary rule has been limited by the Supreme Court's
view that the good faith of the police should be considered when dealing
with the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court has limited its recognition
of a good faith exception to cases involving police actions based on an
46. 51 U.S.L.W. 4709 (June 8, 1983) (No. 81-430).
47. Id. at 4712.
48. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).

49. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
51. Id. at 280.
52. Note, The Evisceration of the Exclusionary Rule: The Supreme Court Invents the Oral
Evidence Exception, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 323 (1980).

53. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978).
54. It must be remembered that the function of the exclusionary rule is to deter future illegal
activit.
55. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
57. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978).
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ordinance which is later declared unconstitutional"8 or on existing case law
which is later held to be bad law. 69 When officers act in good faith and
violate only technical standards, the argument for excluding evidence obtained is weaker because the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful or negligent
conduct in depriving the defendant of some right. 60 Thus when police act in
good faith on a warrant which is later invalidated or pursuant to a statute
which is later declared unconstitutional, this good faith should be considered in determining whether to exclude the evidence.6 1 At the opposite
end of the good faith spectrum is willful and negligent disregard of the
defendant's rights. In these cases the deterrent value of exclusion would
most likely be effective. 62 Although the Supreme Court has only recognized
the good faith exception in these limited circumstances, if it recognizes that
deterrence is the main function for the exclusionry rule then it should
logically adopt the good faith exception in other circumstances. Police officers who, in good faith, believe they are acting lawfully will not be deterred by excluding evidence obtained through these actions.
All of these exceptions and limitations to the exclusionary rule have
been characterized as leading to its total demise by a whittling away at both
ends. 3 However, a better understanding of what has happened to the rule
is provided by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates et.
ux.64 The trend and direction of the exclusionary rule decisions indicate a
fuller appreciation of the costs incurred when reliable evidence is withheld
from the trier of fact.6 5 The costs include interference with the truthseeking function of the trial court and deterring legitimate as well as unlawful
police activity.6 6 This "fuller appreciation" of the costs involved leads to a
more limited application of the exclusionary rule but certainly not to its
total demise.
MIRANDA AND SELF-INCRIMINATION

In Mirandav. Arizona,6 7 the Supreme Court considered whether there
were times when an individual's statements, given while under police
custody, should be inadmissible as evidence against the defendant in order
to protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 68 The
Court examined various police manuals which documented successful procedures for obtaining confessions 69 and the entire interrogation atmosphere in which the defendant is placed. 70 The Court realized the possible evils of such an atmosphere, and devised procedural safeguards to pro58.
59.
60.
61.

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
Id.

62. Id.

63. Note, supra note 52, at 335.
64. 51 U.S.L.W. 4709, 4718 (June 8, 1983) (No. 81-430)IWhite, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 4721.
66. Id.
67. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
68. Id. at 439.
69. Id. at 448.
70. Id. at 456.
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tect fifth amendment rights. These safeguards must be observed unless
other procedures, at least as effective in apprising the individual of his
right of silence and assuring him of a continuous opportunity to exercise it,
are devised. 71
The Court devised the following warnings to insure that the person in
custody is aware of his rights. First the person must be informed in clear
and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. This warning
must be accompanied by the explanation that anything he says can and will
be used against him in court. The person must be told of his right to consult
with a lawyer and to have counsel present during questioning. Finally, the
person must be informed that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. 2 These warnings are the result of the Court seeking a protective device to dispel the compelling atmoshpere of interrogation. 3
There is one other point to consider in the Miranda decision. The
holding was briefly stated near the beginning of the decision: the prosecution may not use any statements, stemming from a custodial interrogation
of the individual unless it demonstrates that the procedural safeguards
were used.7 4 However, the court also stated that "unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, 'no
' s
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. 7
A. A Clarificationof Miranda
In Michigan v. Tucker,' 6 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
answer the question of whether the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
should apply to Mirandaviolations. In Tucker, the defendant was arrested
and advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel. 7 7 He
was also told that any statement he made could be used against him in
court.7 8 The police did not, however, advise the defendant that counsel
would be furnished free of charge if he could not afford the services
himself.79 Tucker then stated to the police that he had been with Henderson
at the time the rape, for which he was being questioned, occurred.8 0
Henderson discredited the defendant's story and in fact testified at trial in
the prosecution's case-in-chief. 8'
Tucker's conviction was affirmed by both the Michigan Court of Appeals8 2 and the Michigan Supreme Court. 8 Tucker then sought and was
granted habeas corpus relief by the Federal District Court.8 4 The district
court held that Tucker had not been given his full Mirandawarnings and so
71. Id. at 467.
72. Id. at 467-68.
73. Id. at 465.
74. Id. at 444.
75. Id. at 479.
76. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
77. Id. at 436.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 436-37.
82. People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W. 2d 712 (Mich. 1969).
83. People v. Tucker, 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W. 2d 290 (Mich. 1971).
84. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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the testimony of Henderson, whose identity was learned through Tucker's
statements, should have been excluded in order to protect Tucker's fifth
for the sixth circuit affirmamendment rights.8 5 After the Court of Appeals
87
ed,86 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that the facts
of the case strongly indicated that the police conduct did not deprive
Tucker of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but only failed to make available the full measure of Miranda's procedural
safeguards.88 The Court acknowledged that Miranda required that
statements taken in violation of the Mirandaprinciples cannot be used to
prove the prosecution's case at trial8 9 and that fruits of police conduct infringing on a defendant's fourth amendment rights must also be suppressed.9 0 However, the Court noted that it had already concluded that the
police conduct did not violate Tucker's privilege against self-incrimination
but only violated the prophylactic standards of Miranda.91 This indicated
that the warnings 2 required by Miranda are not Constitutional rights but
are only a protective shield developed to protect Constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court then determined that there was no controlling precedent
and the question of whether Henderson's testimony should be excluded had
to be decided as a question of principle.98
The Court turned to the rationale of the exclusionary rule and noted
that in a search and seizure context the prime purpose of the rule is to deter
future unlawful police conduct.9 4 The rule is calculated to prevent, not to
repair, and is to compel respect for constitutional guaranty by removing
the incentive to disregard it. 6 This rationale, the Court suggested, would
seem to be applicable to the fifth amendment context in a proper caseY6
While continuing its search for the principles underlying the exclusionary
rule, the Court discussed the need to protect the courts from untrustworthy evidence and the notion that the government is required to shoulder the
entire load.97
The Court then stated that there should be a balancing of the
interests. 98 The reasons for exclusion should be balanced against the
"strong" interest of any system of justice in making available to the trier of
fact all relevant and trustworthy evidence. 99 If deterrence is the primary
function of the exclusionary rule, 100 the amount of deterrence that
85. Id. at 268.
86. Tucker v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1973).
87. 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
88. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
89. Id. at 445.
90. Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). See supratext accompanying
notes 26-34.
91. 417 U.S. at 445-46.
92. See supra text accompanying note 72.
93. 417 U.S. at 446.
94. Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).
95. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)).
96. Id. at 447.
97. Id. at 448, 449.
98. Id. at 450.
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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excluding the evidence can be expected to produce will obviously be the
determining factor in this balancing test. This is because the other purposes for exclusion (keeping the courts from becoming accomplices and
assuring people that the government will not profit from its illegal
behavior) are not variables. The interest in making available relevant
evidence to the trier of fact is not a variable either. This leaves deterrence
as the determining factor in this balancing test. When the police action was
in good faith, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 101 Since
deterrence determines the balancing test and because good faith can have
such an effect on deterrence, good faith of the police will necessarily go a
long way in determining whether evidence should be excluded. In Tucker
the Court determined that the balance fell in favor of admitting the
evidence. 10 2 The Court considered it significant that the failure to advise
Tucker of his rights occurred prior to the Miranda decision.'10 Since
Mirandawas held to apply to Tucker's case 10 4 this last statement indicates
that the good faith of the police must have been the significant factor.
So, in Tucker, the Supreme Court ruled that testimony from a witness,
whose identity was learned through a defendant's statements made
without the proper Mirandawarnings, could be used as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. This might seem to answer our question, except that
the Court in Tucker expressly stated that it was not answering the broad
question of whether evidence obtained from statements taken in violation
of the Mirandarules must be excluded, regardless, of when the interrogation took place. 0° The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan should erase
any doubts as to whether the Court had any intention of deciding this question in Tucker. Justice Brennan stated that if Mirandais applicable at all to
the fruits of statements made without proper warnings, it should be limited
to those cases in which the fruits were obtained as a result of post-Miranda
interrogations. 106 Thus Tucker makes Mirandawarnings mere prophylacwhich can be violated without violating fifth amendment
tic standards
rights.107
The Supreme Court has not expressly stated whether the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine should apply to evidence obtained through
statements elicited without proper Miranda warnings. However, if the
function of the exclusionary rule is to prevent future violations of fourth
amendment rights through deterrence, it is logical to extend the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of Miranda in order to protect fifth amendment rights. In Tucker the Supreme Court stated that in a
proper case the deterrence rationale would be applicable in the fifth amendment context.10 8 If the rationale behind the rule is applicable to the fifth
amendment, it seems logical that the rule itself should be applicable to the
417 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Only Justice Douglas felt that any violation of Miranda warnings without a showing of
other fully effective means to notify the person of his rights, is always a violation of the
fifth amendment. 417 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108. 417 U.S. at 447.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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fifth amendment context. Lower courts have held that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine is applicable to Miranda violations.

CASES THAT HAVE APPLIED THE "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS
TREE" DOCTRINE TO MIRANDA VIOLATIONS

In UnitedStates v. Cassell,'09 the defendant Jackson 110 was involved in
a scheme of stealing checks from the mail and forging the payee's name.
While under custodial interrogation Jackson was given his full Miranda
warnings, except he was told that a lawyer would be appointed for him if
and when he went before a United States Commissioner."' In response to
questions asked by the officials, Jackson admitted that one of the forged
signatures appeared to be in his writing. 1 12 In addition, Jackson gave the
handwriting exemplar which was compared with forged
officials a 113
signatures.
The court concluded that the statement was inadmissible because of the
Miranda violation. 1 4 The Cassell court also held that the handwriting exemplar was also inadmissible as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," even
though the court recognized that other federal courts had held that compelling the modeling of clothing and submissions to blood tests and fingerprinting were not violations of the privilege against self-incrimination. 116
Although the Cassell court recognized that the Supreme Court in Gilbert v.
California' 6 had held that the taking of handwriting exemplars did not
any evidence is
violate fifth amendment rights, the court still declared that
17
inadmissible if obtained in violation of the Constitution.
The Cassell court's referral to evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution would seem to mean that the court felt that an improper or incomplete Mirandawarning is a violation of the fifth amendment. Since the
Supreme Court later held, in Michigan v. Tucker," 8 that an improper
Miranda warning was not necessarily a fifth amendment violation, 1 9 the
court's reasoning in Cassell should no longer stand. The purpose of including Cassell, a pre-Tucker case, is to show the effect that Tucker and its
description of the prophylactic standards of Miranda,have had on this application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Nevertheless, Cassell
has been referred to as authority for applying the "fruit of the poisonous
obtained from statements made without proper
tree" doctrine to evidence
20
Mirandawarnings.1
109. 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971).
110. There were three defendants in Cassell. However, only defendant Jackson's case is considered in this analysis.
111. 452 F.2d at 541.
112. Id. at 540.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 541.
115. Id.
116. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
117. 452 F.2d at 541.
118. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
119. See supra text accomapnying notes 91-92.
120. See LAFAVE, supra note 39, at § 11.4.
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In Commonwealth v. White, 121 the defendant successfully appealed his
conviction when Massachusetts' highest court held that evidence used by
the prosecution should not have been admitted. 122 In White, the defendant
had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 128
The defendant tried to reach an attorney but kept dropping coins and acted
like "he didn't know what he was doing."' 124 After a breathalyzer test indicated that he was intoxicated, the defendant was searched and placed in a
holding cell. 12 5 The search revealed a marihuana cigarette and prompted
the officer to ask the defendant if he had any other marihuana on his person
or in his car.1 26 When the defendant responded that he had more in his car,
.the officer applied for and received a search warrant based on the defendant's statement.1 27 A search of the car's trunk produced various controlled substances
and other evidence that was used against the defendant at
trial.128
The trial judge ruled that the statements were not admissible because
the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of showing that the defendant
had knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination. 12 9 The trial
judge ruled, however, that the evidence seized from the car did not have to
be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."1 0 Massachusetts' highest
court disagreed with the trial judge 1on this last point and held that the
evidence should have been excluded.
This holding, overruling the trial judge, exemplifies a correct application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to a Mirandaviolation. In
White the officer's conduct can be considered a violation of the "prophylac3 2
tic standards" of Miranda.'
However, even though the conduct only
violated "prophylactic standards" of Miranda, it did lead to statements
which were used to support the issuance of a search warrant. If a court admits evidence obtained through such a search warrant then the court would
not be deterring illegal police action. The police would actually be encouraged to elicit statements (legally or illegally) from a defendant because
such statements could then be used to secure a search warrant. The police
could rest assured that evidence gathered through this warrant would be
admissible even though they would not have been able to secure the warrant, and thus the evidence, without the illegally elicited statements.
The final case to consider is United States Ex. Rel. Hudson v.
Cannon.13 s In this case the defendant (Hudson) was arrested, taken to the
police station and questioned. 13 4 Hudson claimed that he was not told of his
121. 374 Mass. 132 (1977), 371 N.E. 2d 777, cert. granted sub nom. Massachusetts v. White,
436 U.S. 925 (1978), reh'g denied 439 U.S. 1136 (1979).
122. Id. at 781.
123. Id. at 778.
124. Id. at 779.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id at 781.
132. See supratext accompanying notes 91-92.
133. 529 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1976).
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right to remain silent, and was denied his requests to phone his attorney. 13 5
Hudson implicated an accomplice during this interrogation and this accomplice (and another accomplice who was implicated by the first) testified
against Hudson at his trial. 136 The district court judge held that the
Supreme Court's balancing test in Michigan v. Tucker 3 7 implied that the
interest in securing trustworthy evidence was sufficient to justify the ad13 8
mission of fruits (testimony of accomplices) of an involuntary statement.
The court of appeals correctly overruled this holding and noted that
nothing in Tucker suggests that there need not be exclusion of third party
can show that such testimony is the product
testimony when the defendant
3 9
of coerced statements.
The Hudson court was split on the question of whether third party
testimonial evidence should ever be excluded based only on the omission of
Mirandawarnings.1 40 The majority felt that the deterrent effect was not
sufficient, in such a case, to warrant exclusion.' The author of the opinion, Chief Judge Fairchild, felt that the majority's view failed to heed
Tucker's emphasis on good faith. 42 Tucker and its emphasis on good
faith '48 supports Chief Judge Fairchild's position that Tucker should not be
read as holding that there is never enough deterrent effect, when there is
only a Mirandaviolation, to justify excluding third party testimonial fruits.

STAMPER

When a court is confronted with the question of whether evidence obtained through a statement made without proper Mirandawarnings should
be admissible it should follow a logical process. This process can be illustrated by applying it to the case of Stamper v. Wyoming.
First a court must determine whether the evidence falls within the exclusionary rule in general. When a court takes this first step it must keep in
mind the function of exclusion, primarily deterrence. In Stamper, the police
failed to give any Mirandawarnings.14 4 This conduct must be and would be
discouraged by excluding the boots.
Next a court must determine whether any of the major exceptions to
the exclusionary rule- apply. The valid exceptions are the independent
source rule and the attenuation exception. Criticisms of the inevitable
discovery exception are valid and this exception should be rejected. A court
should not permit speculation as to whether the evidence would have been
discovered without the illegal conduct. Police short-cutting will be deterred
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 891.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
529 F.2d at 892.
Id.
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 895.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
662 P.2d at 85, n.5.
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by rejecting the inevitable discovery exception. 1 5 If a court accepts the inevitable discovery exception it must be convinced that the evidence would
inevitably have been discovered. In Stamper, the boots do not meet the attenuation exception since they were recovered directly and immediately
through the Mirandaviolation. There is no indication that the police would
have discovered the boots through an independent source. Finally, it is not
possible to determine whether the trial judge would have concluded that
the boots fit within the inevitable discovery exception because there was no
need, and thus no attempt, to convince the trial judge that the boots would
inevitably have been discovered.
Assuming the evidence is within the exclusionary rule's protection, a
court must apply the Supreme Court's balancing test.1 46 Items which must
be weighed on the side for exclusion include: (1) the need to prevent the
courts from becoming accomplices in disobedience of the Constitution; (2)
assuring people that the government will not profit from its own illegal
acts; (3) deterring these illegal acts and thus protecting Constitutional
rights in the future. On the opposite side of the balance are items which
must be weighed in favor of admitting the evidence. These items include:
(1) the "strong" interest in making available to the trier of fact all relevant
information; and (2) the costs imposed on legitimate police activities by excluding evidence.
In all cases, there is a need to make available to the trier of fact all relevant evidence. Excluding relevant evidence will always have a negative impact on the truthseeking function, and the need for a "correct" result will
never vary. Although excluding evidence can have an adverse impact by
discouraging some legitimate police activities, excluding the evidence in
Stamper would only serve to encourage the police to give Miranda warnings and this would hardly impose a burden on legitimate police activities.
On the exclusion side of the balance, deterrence is the only variable.
The need to prevent courts from becoming accomplices and to assure people that the government will not profit from wrongdoing will not vary from
case to case. The deterrent effect that excluding evidence will produce does
vary in each case. In Stamper, the deterrent effect produced by excluding
the boots would be the primary consideration.
Both the type of evidence and the good faith of the police must be considered since both affect the amount of deterrence. 47 The boots were
tangible evidence and unlike witnesses could not be discovered through
their own volition. Thus there was more incentive to conduct illegal activity
to discover the boots (as opposed to a willing witness). The deterrent effect
of excluding the evidence in Stamper would be greater than the deterrent
effect of excluding a voluntary witness, illegally discovered, and the court
must consider this effect.
145. See supra note 44.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
147. Distinguishing between types of evidence in these caseshas been attacked as illogical and
arbitrary. See Note, Miranda Without Warning: Derivative Evidence as Forbidden
Fruit,41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 325, 347 (1974).
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In addition to the type of evidence, the good faith of the police must be
considered. Here the equation is: the greater the good faith the less the
deterrent effect and thus the weaker the argument to exclude evidence. In
Stamper, the police failed to give any Mirandawarnings and this was standard procedure. Excluding evidence in such cases should certainly deter
the police from continuing such a policy. Although the atmosphere and the
way the request was made should be considered, the fact remains that
Stamper was already under arrest and in a custodial setting. A technical
violation of Miranda'sprophylactic standards is easily dismissed because
excluding evidence in such cases will not have a great deterrent effect. The
Mirandaviolation in Stamper,however, was not a mere technical violation.
CONCLUSION

There is no logical reason not to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to evidence obtained through statements made without proper
Mirandawarnings. The exclusion of evidence can protect both fourth and
fifth amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Before determining
whether of not evidence must be excluded the judge should follow a logical
process. Finally the judge must remember that the primary function of exclusion is to protect Constitutional rights by deterring illegal police activity
in the future.
DAVID K. GRUVER
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